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Introduction
How does income inequality change in the outcome of a banking crisis? From a theoretical point of view, financial crises can lead to bankruptcies and falls in asset prices, generate deep recessions and demand policy responses such as bailouts, but their effects on inequality are not clear (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011) . From an empirical perspective, the 1929 crash was followed by a substantial correction in inequality, because wealth losses and financial reforms hit the top of income distribution. In contrast, the most recent turmoil witnessed a slight fall in income gap, but no clear trend on how it will evolve in the future.
Freeman (2010) finds that inequality increases dramatically before financial crises.
Similarly, a number of authors analyze the link between income inequality, household debt leverage, and financial crises and emphasize that the role of credit demand (Rajan, 2010; Reich, 2010) or credit supply (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Levitin and Wachter, 2010) in explaining the high debt levels of households at the bottom of income distribution.
Hubbard (2010) argues that policymakers appear to be responsible for the latest crises.
1 Moss (2009) investigates whether huge income gaps create "wrong" incentives that increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Stiglitz (2009) suggests that the combination of stagnant real incomes and increased borrowing by low income households leads to an unsustainable path that makes default and financial crises more likely. Blair (2010) shows that, because asset bubbles typically lead to higher returns, the banking system has the potential to generate highly leveraged systems and increase inequality.
In this paper, we find that income inequality significantly increases at the onset of a banking crises and declines afterwards. In addition, while, for OECD countries, the distributional effects of banking crises over income occur after the event and reduce inequality, Non-OECD countries observe a significant rise in inequality before the onset of the crisis.
We also show that the government size does not per se reduce inequality, which casts some doubts about the redistributive effects of fiscal policy, in particular, for OECD countries.
Interestingly, in OECD countries, a better access to credit from the banking sector helps achieving a reduction in inequality. However, households at the top of the income distribution seem to have been favoured in richer countries.
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Econometric Framework
We estimate the following dynamic panel data model:
for i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, T i , where Gini it is the Gini inequality index for country i at time t and X is a set of control variables including government size, income per capita, financial depth (i.e. domestic credit provided by the banking sector in percentage of GDP) and unemployment rate. 
Data and Empirical Results
We use annual data for 62 OECD and non-OECD countries and the sample period Inequality is a very persistent variable, which reflects that changes in the income distribution within the country do not often occur.
We do not find a significant effect of government size on income inequality. While Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) show that redistribution by the government leads to a reduction of disparities, Krugman (2008) argues that inequality is primarily the result of political change in the form of rising polarization. This suggests that broad fiscal policies do not per se reduce inequality.
Income per capita has a positive and significant impact on income inequality, although the magnitude of the effect is very small. This can be linked to the higher wealth inequality driven by the poor performance of middle class families and those at the bottom of the income distribution in rich countries (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010) .
A fall in unemployment and an ease of the access to credit from the banking sector allows households in the low-end of the income distribution to borrow and achieve higher living standards. As a result, inequality is reduced.
[ Table 1 ]
In Tables 2 and 3 , we replicate the estimation of model (1) for developed (OECD) and developing (Non-OECD) countries. An interesting difference between the two groups emerges: while, for OECD countries, inequality significantly drops after a banking crisis, Non-OECD countries experience a rise in inequality before the crisis.
For OECD countries, a rise in the government size exacerbates income inequality, in line with the perception of a lack of soundness in fiscal policies. As for financial depth, this variable is particularly relevant and effective in reducing income gaps. For Non-OECD countries, neither the government size nor financial depth is statistically significant, which largely reflects the dysfunctionalities of credit markets.
[ Table 2] [ Table 3 ]
Conclusion
This paper shows that income gaps rise before banking crisis episodes and sharply falls afterwards. Moreover, inequality: (i) is not per se reduced by a large government size;
and (ii) diminishes with the rise in financial depth.
Some authors argue that the lack of government regulation increased the debt leverage for the group at the bottom of income distribution and boosted the vulnerability to financial crises (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010) .
From a policy perspective, this would demand more regulation and tax and social policies aimed at shortening the disparities between the poor and the rich. We plan to explore this research avenue in the future. Left website, January 9 th . Brekke, Kurt R. Luigi Siciliani e Odd Rune Straume, "Quality competition with profit constraints: Do non-profit firms provide higher quality than for-profit firms?", 2011
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